Trade and geopolitics

Key takeaways from the APEC and G20 summits

Rohanshi Vaid

Published 03 December 2024

The APEC and G20 summits of this year highlighted a rapidly changing global order. China strategically leveraged the meetings to strengthen ties not only with developing nations but also with Western powers. An outgoing Biden administration kept US presence relatively muted, as the shadow of uncertainty over American foreign policy under Trump hung over the summits’ outcomes.

The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Leaders’ Meeting in Peru and the Group of 20 Summit in Brazil last month highlighted a shifting global geopolitical landscape. At both forums, China positioned itself as a reliable and constructive partner as the US appears to accelerate economic confrontation globally and an inward turn away from global engagement.

Chinese President Xi Jinping used these platforms to lay the groundwork for China’s bid for global leadership in a unified stance against tariffs and isolationist policies, which would advance China’s strategic interests. His engagements, including those on the sidelines, signal China plans to gain strategic advantage particularly in the Global South from Donald Trump’s presidency to expand China’s economic and political influence, particularly in South America.

An outgoing Biden administration kept the US presence at the summits relatively muted. Uncertainty over US foreign policy under Trump also clouded the summits’ outcomes.

Xi’s push for global leadership

At the APEC and G20 summits, Xi strengthened ties with Latin American partners through bilateral meetings and initiatives tied to China’s global infrastructure-building Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Ahead of the APEC summit in Lima, he inaugurated a massive US$3.5 billion deep-water port in the Peruvian coastal town of Chancay, a strategic investment and critical link in the BRI.

The port is expected to upend maritime trade in the continent’s trans-Pacific trade with Asia and establish Peru as a logistics hub. While this investment reflects China’s growing economic and geopolitical influence in the region, US officials raised concerns over the port’s potential use for espionage and surveillance.¹ Moreover, Xi’s meeting with Peruvian President Dina Boluarte culminated in the signing of 30 memoranda of understanding (MOUs) and an upgraded free trade agreement that is expected to boost bilateral commerce between the two countries by at least 50%.²

On the sidelines of APEC, Xi met with Chilean President Gabriel Boric, where both leaders expressed intent to deepen bilateral ties and back China’s bid to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), making Chile’s endorsement the second vote from Latin America after Peru.³

At the APEC Leader’s meeting, Xi announced initiatives to enhance cross-border data flows and promote green innovation, putting China at least ostensibly in position to take global leadership on contentious and pressing multilateral trade and sustainability agenda– and setting itself up as a champion in sharp contrast to Trump’s "America First" rhetoric.

Xi further sought to emphasize an as-yet amorphous notion of "true multilateralism", which seemed designed to play to developing countries like Brazil and Peru and against the US playbook at stepping away from multilateral cooperation. At the G20, he reemphasized China’s willingness to reduce or eliminate tariffs, reinforcing its appeal to the Global South. As a part of China’s Global Development Initiatives, Xi also announced the launch of the Open Science International Cooperation Initiative, led by China, Brazil, South Africa, and the African Union. This initiative aims to ensure that technological advancements benefit developing and underdeveloped nations.

After the G20 summit, Xi stayed in Brazil for an official state visit, during which he and President Lula signed 37 bilateral agreements covering trade, technology, and environmental cooperation.⁴ Despite Brazil’s decision not to formally join China’s BRI, a key goal for Beijing, Xi upgraded Brazil's diplomatic status and demonstrated his commitment to strengthening ties.

China’s slew of engagements at the two summits are reflective of how it strategically leveraged these forums to strengthen ties not only with developing nations but also with Western powers, including the United Kingdom and Australia, aiming to position itself as a constructive partner to both.

The wider Global South rises

The Global South has emerged as a stronger force within the G20 amid the growing difficulty in the group’s ability to balance divergent priorities.

Brazil’s presidency, a year after India and a year before South Africa, emphasized Global South priorities such as alleviating poverty, reducing inequalities, and reforming global governance. It launched the Global Alliance against Hunger and Poverty, aiming to eradicate hunger and extreme poverty by 2030.⁵

Additionally, Brazilian President Lula da Silva proposed a 2% annual tax on the ultra-wealthy, with the potential to generate US$200–250 billion annually. While the proposal ignited significant debate and brought global attention to inequality, resistance from nations like the US and Germany prevented a binding agreement. Despite the lack of concrete commitments, the Rio Summit succeeded in floating wealth taxation on the international agenda.

The expansion of BRICS, led by Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, set to include more emerging economies such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Turkey, is also indicative of the greater leeway to play up priorities for the Global South.

Global governance reforms

Reforming global governance was another central theme of the G20 summit. For the first time, a G20 summit devoted significant attention to modernizing multilateral development banks (MDBs) and reforming the United Nations (UN), especially the UN Security Council and other bodies such as the Economic and Social Council. A G20 roadmap towards "better, bigger, and more effective" MDBs, adopted during the Rio Summit, outlined measures to enhance accountability and unlock additional financing for developing countries, recognizing the immense funding needs for sustainable development.⁶ There were commitments to revise the International Monetary Fund (IMF) quotas and enhance the role of MDBs to support low- and middle-income countries in achieving the UN's 2030 Agenda. It’s uncertain whether such initiatives will endure under future G20 presidencies, particularly the US under Trump in 2026.

The road ahead

The APEC and G20 summits highlighted a rapidly changing global order. Xi leveraged these platforms to position China as a champion for developing nations.

Brazil’s G20 presidency helped to push Global South priorities, an agenda likely to also be pursued by South Africa’s upcoming G20 presidency in 2025.

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[1] How China Capitalized on U.S. Indifference in Latin America - WSJ
[2] Exclusive: Peru and China to sign strengthened free-trade agreement in Xi's APEC visit | Reuters
[3] https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zy/jj/xjpcxapecg20/202411/t20241118_11528436.html
[4] China’s Xi, Lula meet in Brasilia to 'enhance ties'
[5] https://www.g20.org/en/documents/g20-rio-de-janeiro-leaders-declaration
[6] How China Capitalized on U.S. Indifference in Latin America - WSJ

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Author

Rohanshi Vaid

Ms. Vaid is the Research Manager for the International Trade Research Program at the Hinrich Foundation, with a diverse background in public policy, economic research, management consulting, and international relations.

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